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Although the existing theory predicts that a referral’s chances of being hired increase with the job performance
of the referrer, no empirical evidence is available to support this claim. To address this discrepancy, we
decompose the recruitment process into objective selection, subjective selection, and self-selection and
theorize that the likelihood of passing a particular recruitment stage increases with the performance of the
referrer under objective selection and self-selection, but remains undetermined at a stage of subjective
selection. Our analysis of unique comprehensive data on online recruitment of sales agents in a virtual call
center supports these arguments. The effectiveness of personnel as a recruitment channel varies with the type
of the recruitment stage and performance of the referrer. When the firm evaluates candidates by an objective
criterion, the advantage of a referral increases with the performance of his or her referrer; those referred by
relatively high-performing workers are significantly better than the applicants who learned about the job from
Internet ads. When job candidates self-select into the next stage of the online application process, the referral
of any agent is more likely to continue than a nonreferral, and this likelihood increases with the performance
of the referrer. On a subjective stage, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the recruitment process.
In our case, an applicant’s chances of being hired increase with the performance of his or her referrer because
the firm rejects the referrals of low-performing workers at a higher rate than it does nonreferrals, while it treats
equally the referrals of high-performing workers and nonreferrals. The study’s contributions to the literature
on social networks in labor markets are discussed.
Keywords
labor markets, social networks, virtual recruitment, hiring through referrals, contingent workers
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Human Resources Management
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/113
Recruitment to a Virtual Organization: 
Does a Referral Matter? 
Valery Yakubovich 
Daniela Lup 
University of Chicago 
Direct correspondence to: Valery Y akubovich, valery@ChicagoGSB. edu. 
Abstract 
We explore network recruitment in a new Internet-based organizational setting 
characterized by arm' s-length relationships between the employer and workers and 
heightened competition among workers. Personal contacts remain a salient recruitment 
channel, although their effectiveness v aries with the type of the recruitment stage: self-
selection, objective selection, and subj ective selection. We argue that on a self-selection 
stage, where a job candidate decides herself whether to proceed to the next stage of the 
on-line application process, referrals of current agents are more likely to follow through. 
On an objective selection stage, where the firm evaluates candidates by an objectiv e 
criterion, the advantage of a referral increases with the performance of her referrer; the 
referrals of relatively higher-performing workers do better than the applicants referred by 
inferior candidates. Finally, on a subjective stage, where HR personnel make a judgment 
about a candidate' s qualifications, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the 
recruitment process. In our case, an applicant' s chances increase with the performance of 
her referrer, but primarily because the firm rej ects the referrals of worse-performing 
candidates rather than giv es an advantage to those of better performing ones. The analysis 
utilizes unique comprehensive data on on-line recruitment of sales agents in a virtual call 
center (VCC). The study ' s contributions to the literature on social networks in labor 
markets are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ov er the last decade, scholars of organizations have been witnessing the rapid proliferation of a 
"virtual" organization characterized by the geographic dispersion of its employees who rely on 
electronic means to perform their functions and communicate with each other (for review, see 
Burris 1998, DeSanctis and Monge 1999). Physical separation is often accompanied by lateral 
contractual relationships between the employer and employees (Jarillo 1993 ). Proponents of the 
virtual organization emphasize its flexibility and responsiveness to rapidly changing market 
conditions; critics see a weakening of the organizational identity, worker loyalty, and social 
cohesion that are key determinants of performance (Dav idow and Malone 1992). While such 
questions are debated, the number of workers who experience the virtual organizational form on 
a regular basis rapidly grows. According to Gartner Group' s estimate, the number ofteleworkers, 
defined as those who work from home at least 8 hours a week, more than doubled, from about 5 
million in 1999 to 12 million in 2005, and they currently comprise 9.2% of the labor force (Jones 
2005). 
Although these changes have direct implications for recruitment, very little is known 
about the ways in which v irtual organizations recruit workers, in particular, about the role of 
recruitment through social networks, the most common and well-studied channel in traditional 
settings. The received theory posits that recruitment is an inherently social process in which 
personal relationships among employers, job seekers, and intermediaries play a leading role, 
providing intensive hard-to-measure information, attracting candidates who would not apply 
through formal labor market channels, and securing a smoother adjustment and more effective 
training. Job candidates referred by the firm's current workers are more likely to survive the 
selection process and perform on the job because they possess more appropriate observable and 
unobservable characteristics, have a deeper understanding of the j ob' s requirements and the 
firm's culture, and receive informal help with training and socialization (for rev iew of the 
literature, see Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Granovetter 1995; Marsden and Goorman 
2001 ). Estimations show that employers' investment in the social capital of their employees in 
the form of bonuses for successful referrals deliver nontrivial economic returns (Fernandez, 
Castilla, and Moore 2000). Management textbooks support such practices because referrals "are 
more satisfied, productive, and likely to remain" with the firm (Baron and Kreps 1999: 342). 
These arguments either explicitly of implicitly assume that workers strongly identifY 
themselv es with their organization and are loy al to it. If this were not the case, they would 
consider referrals exclusiv ely as an opportunity to help their family and friends while treating 
any concerns about the abilities and qualifications of job candidates as the employer' s business. 
Therefore, to the degree in which the v irtual organization undermines workers' organizational 
identity and establishes an arm's-length employment relationship, recruitment through referrals 
becomes problematic. In addition, insecure employment and the need to constantly defend one' s 
position against internal and external competitors creates a disincentive for referring and training 
strong candidates who can threaten the referrer herself. 
Inevitable changes in the technology of the recruitment process compound these 
problems further. So far, the well-familiar face-to-face interview remains an integral part of 
recruitment in most organizations. However, as the practice of outsourcing whole business 
functions such as sales and customer support grows, performing the same functions in 
geographically dispersed locations is becoming widely accepted and even economically 
necessary. Remote recruitment is a part of this process and the Internet appears to be the most 
appropriate medium for it. 
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On one hand, the Internet offers a promising arena for matching employers and workers, 
reduces for them the costs of seeking each other, and provides effective tools for testing and 
assessing job candidates. On the other hand, it heightens the problem of adverse self-selection, 
since less able candidates, who in the past would not bother to apply, find it very easy to do 
electronically. Autor (2001) predicts that in response to adv erse self-selection, employers ' 
reliance on personal contacts will become even more pervasive. How ever, if in a v irtual 
organization referrers are not concerned with their proteges' fit to the job, they will exacerbate 
adverse selection rather than prevent it. 
W e argue that under such circumstances, referrals ' likelihood of advancing successfully 
through the recruitment process relative to nonreferrals is contingent on the selection 
mechanism. Only referrals of relatively high-performing agents are actually better when an 
objective selection criterion is sy stematically applied across all applicants, because of social 
homophily between the referral and referrer and information and help provided by the latter to 
the former. However, on average any referral is more likely to self-select herself into the job than 
a nonreferral which points to adverse self-selection driv en by referrals' stronger motiv ation and 
knowledge of the intricacies of the recruitment process. The important issue is whether HR 
personnel can control self-selection by identifYing and rejecting poor matches v ia subjective 
selection. 
Our analysis of unique comprehensive data on on-line recruitment of sales agents in a 
virtual call center (VCC) generally supports these arguments. Personal contacts remain a salient 
recruitment channel, although their effectiveness varies with the type of the recruitment stage: 
self-selection, objectiv e selection, and subjective selection. When job candidates self-select into 
the next stage of the online application process, referrals of current agents are more likely to 
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continue. When the firm evaluates candidates by an objective criterion, the advantage of a 
referral increases with the performance of her referrer; only the referrals of relatively higher-
performing workers are significantly better than the applicants who learned about the job from 
Internet ads. Finally , on a subjective stage, where HR personnel make a judgment about a 
candidate 's qualifications, the outcome is contingent on the intricacies of the recruitment 
process. In our case, an applicant' s chances increase with the performance of her referrer, but 
primarily because the firm rejects the referrals of worse-performing candidates rather than g ives 
an adv antage to those of better performing ones. 
The paper is organized as follows: first, we present relevant theoretical arguments and 
formulate two testable propositions. Next, we describe the empirical setting, which is 
substantially different from those in which similar studies have been conducted. The third section 
is devoted to a detailed description of our data and research methodology. After providing 
empirical findings, we summarize them, h ighlight their limitations, and discuss their implications 
for labor markets and our future research agenda. 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
A number of recent case studies of organizations carefully document the role of referrals in 
recruitment. We learn that by and large referrals enjoy advantage over nonreferrals due to their 
propensity to present more appropriate resumes, to apply when market conditions are more 
favorable, and to rely on the reputation, influence, and support of their sponsors (Fernandez and 
Weinberg 1997; Fernandez, Castilla, and More 2000). Not surprising ly, access to potential 
referrers and the ability to mobilize them become major factors in hiring and, for example, 
explain hiring rate differentials among ethnic groups (Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000). 
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By relying on workers' social networks, employers economize on hiring costs and share 
these savings with the very same workers in the form of bonuses for successful referrals 
(Fernandez, Castilla, and More 2000). Such formal referral programs proliferate despite the lack 
of evidence that referrals are actually better workers. Castilla (2005) provides the first credible 
evidence that referrals are more productive than nonreferrals right after the hire, but the 
advantage disappears in the long run and, moreover, turns into a disadvantage if the referrer quits 
the firm. Neckerman and Fernandez (2003) point to multiple contingencies that may shape the 
impact of referrals on performance, including the firm's organizational structure. It is puzzling, 
however, that the same contingencies do not condition the recruitment process as well; referrals' 
advantage consistently appears at all its stages in the studies currently av ailable. 
"Virtuality" is a new organizational contingency that sheds light on the variation in the 
impact of referrals on both the recruitment process and performance. Being Internet-based, 
virtual recruitment requires a more careful delineation of recruitment stages and leaves an 
extensive electronic trail. These two factors make possible a classification of recruitment stages 
into a set of distinctive categories and enable a comparison of the referral effect across them. 
Any recruitment process typically consists of a number of stages, which we classifY into 
three types: self-selection, objective selection, and subjective selection. On stages of self-
selection, applicants themselves decide whether to proceed further or not; the decisions to submit 
an application and accept an offer are the most common examples. On stages of objective 
selection, an employer consistently applies the same metrics to all candidates and automatically 
makes a decision to move a person to the next stage if a predetermined target is met. Various 
tests with a minimum passing score are the primary example. Subjective selection is 
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characterized by relatively vague and idiosyncratic considerations, with the offer-making stage 
being a good example. 
In a "real" organization, objective selection in the form of tests and other metrics is rarely 
separated into a distinct stage but lumped together with subjective considerations on the stage of 
an interview or job offer. Therefore, the literature typically deals with subjectiv e selection on the 
interview and job offer stages as well as various kinds of self-selection. The transition to virtual 
organization, in general, and virtual recruitment, in particular, creates both the opportunity and 
the need for clear distinctions among the three types of selection. The opportunity derives from 
the ability ofHR departments to administer tests and other standard recruitment procedures on-
line. Computers are perfectly capable of measuring the outcomes of such procedures and 
employers can delegate to them standardized decisions. If they do, the procedure becomes a 
distinctive selection stage. The need to distinguish among the three types of selection stages 
stems from the impersonal nature of virtual recruitment. Since HR personnel do not monitor and 
guide applicants until late in the process, the process itself has to be well structured and easy to 
navigate. The clear assignment of decision-making to the applicant, computer, or an HR person 
helps achieve this goal. 
We argue that the role of referrals v aries by the type of the recruitment stage. At a self-
selection stage, an applicant herself makes the decision whether to proceed further. The 
employer has few opportunities to encourage desirable candidates or discourage undesirable 
ones. The literature argues that this is one reason why an employer benefits from referrals in the 
traditional setting: the referrer turns into a gatekeeper because she cares about her reputation with 
the employer, knows the candidate' s shortcomings, and therefore is in a good position to 
dissuade her from applying, if necessary. The virtual setting undermines this rationale, since an 
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arm's-length relationship between the employ er and referrer greatly diminishes the latter' s 
reputational concerns. At the same time, by refusing to promote a relativ e or friend who is less 
qualified, the worker loses reputation with her personal network, within which help with getting 
a job is part of routine reciprocal exchanges enforced by social norms such as "a friend in need is 
a friend, indeed." Thus, a network member's needs drive the referrer ' s actions whether the 
member is qualified to do the job or not. If a network member decides to apply, the referrer will 
support him and help him overcome the hurdles of any self-selection stage: 
PROPOSITION 1. A referral is more likely than a nonreferral to complete a self-selection stage 
of the recruitment process. 
The literature offers a few arguments that explain why referrals should be better than 
nonreferrals by objective measures. Let us start with the oft-cited social homophily argument: 
because people tend to socialize with others similar to them and referrers have survived a prior 
screening process, their referrals are better qualified than nonreferred applicants (Fernandez, 
Castilla, and Moore 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001 ; Montgomery 1991 , Mouw 
2003; My ers and Shultz 1951, Rees and Shultz 1970; Ullman 1966). The argument is 
traditionally formulated in terms of observable socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, 
age, education, social class, religion, as well as behaviors and values (for review, see McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001 ). Empirical evidence does show that referrals and their referrers 
exhibit above-chance levels of homophily on individual characteristics relev ant to recruitment 
(Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000) but it does not show that referrers' characteristics can 
predict referrals ' performance. The latter is not surprising: since socio-demographic 
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characteristics usually explain little about the labor market outcomes of their holder, it is hard to 
expect them to be informative about their holder' s referral. 
In addition, the homophily argument in its current form implicitly assumes that 
employers do not make mistakes in hiring or, if they do, they never learn from them. As a result, 
if a wrong person has been hired, his future referrals, who are similar to him, will be hired as 
well. Howev er, underperforming workers do exist and, according to the very same homophily 
principle, their referrers cannot be that good. To address these inconsistencies, we suggest a 
weak homophily argument which only asserts that the advantage of a referral over a nonreferral 
increases with the fit between the referrer and the job, assuming it is the same job the referral 
applies to. 1 The argument does not imply that referrals are always better than nonreferrals. In 
fact, it allows for the possibility that under some circumstances even referrals of the v ery best 
performers may be indistinguishable from nonreferrals. However, it does suggest monotonicity 
in a referral 's advantage: ifreferrer A ' s protege is better than a nonreferral, the same should be 
the case for an average referrer better than A. 
The second widely accepted argument in favor of referrals is often called a better match 
argument. It builds on the ability of referrers to equip both employers and job candidates with 
detailed, sensitive, and non-standard information about each other and thereby improve the 
overall quality of matches (Rees 1966, Granovetter 1974). Useful bits of information may come 
not only from what referrers say but also from what they do. Neckerman and Fernandez (2003: 
304-305) describe a referral program that allows referrers to choose at the time of making the 
1 In fact, one difficulty with an accurate test of the homophily argument is that referrers more 
often than not hold jobs different from the ones they refer to. F ernandez and Castilla (200 1) find 
that workers with prior experience on a job are more likely to refer candidates to that job. 
However, they do not have access to performance records from prev ious jobs which may it 
difficult to evaluate the homophily argument. 
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referral whether to claim a referral bonus or not. Two-thirds of the referrers did and their 
referrals had a significantly lower turnover rate within the 18 months period after the hire, while 
the referrals of those who did not claim the bonus had the same turnover rate as nonreferrals. 
Thus, referrers have a pretty good idea about the quality of their proteges. 
In a v irtual setting, the arm's-length relationship between an employer and workers may 
impede information transfers from the latter to the former. However, firms and their job 
candidates can still benefit from the candidates' improved knowledge of the j ob opportunity due 
to their contacts with the referrers. As in the case of homophily , better referrers should provide 
better information to their proteges. 
Finally, the conventional theory posits that employers benefit from referrals in the long 
run due to socialization. Hav ing a link to the firm from the beginning helps the newcomer access 
resources, receive informal training, and form ties to other workers (Fernandez, Castilla, and 
Moore 2000). A hidden assumption here is that the spirit of collaboration prevails in 
organizations. We know, on the other hand, that organization members compete against each 
other as well (pfeifer and Sutton 2000) and sales are one of the most competitive lines of 
business. Therefore, getting a new strong competitor is not necessarily in a referrer's best 
interests; however, this becomes less of a concern, the stronger the referrer' s performance. Even 
if a relatively strong referrer sponsors a weaker candidate, that candidate may still be marginally 
better than nonreferrals. Employ ers should worry, however, if the referrer is a weak performer. 
In this case, the competition argument implies that she w ill sponsor a weaker and, more often, 
unqualified candidate. To summarize our discussion, a referral's objective superiority over a 
non-referral should be a monotonically increasing function of the referrer's performance: 
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PROPOSITION 2. On an objective selection stage of the recruitment process, a referral's 
advantage ov er a nonreferral increases with the performance of the referrer. 
While the outcomes of self-selection and objective selection are susceptible to predictions 
regarding the effect of the referrer's performance, the outcome of subjective selection is difficult 
to determine because it is often guided by additional considerations unrelated to the indiv idual 
performance directly. It may be influenced by the very fact that a candidate is referred, if the 
decision maker takes that fact as a signal of the advantages we discussed earlier, even if the 
advantages themselves are not there. For example, Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) find strong 
empirical evidence of the employer' s preference for referrals v is-a-v is other candidates after the 
quality of resumes, including relevant socio-technical characteristics, are taken into account. The 
authors speculate that by doing so the employer rewards the loyalty of its w orkers and gives 
them a sense of empowerment. 
At the same time, there are circumstances under which an employer is disinclined to hire 
referrals. If workers' influence is too strong, the employer may want to prevent their further 
empowerment and therefore will try to avoid hiring through referrals (Manwaring 1984). It may 
be the case that management is unhappy w ith the current labor force for one reason or another 
and wants a change. For a virtual organization, another possible consideration is the geographic 
distribution of its labor force. For example, it is beneficial to have customer service agents 
dispersed across various time zones to ensure uninterrupted service around the clock. This is 
particularly critical when agents work as independent contractors, since they choose their 
working hours themselves . Referrers bring candidates from their own localities and thereby limit 
geographic diversification. 
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Thus, it is impossible to predict in general terms the effect of referrals on subjective 
stages of the selection process; the knowledge of the intricacies of a specific setting is a must. 
We describe our setting in the next section. 
El\IIPIRICAL SETTING 
The Virtual Call Center (VCC) 
We analyze the recruitment of sales agents in a Virtual Call Center (VCC). The Center handles 
for its clients, which are v endors of various products, inquiries and purchases that are generated 
from infomercials broadcast on TV networks. Its entire sales force consists of independent 
contractors who work from home and process orders over the Internet. They are free to 
determine their work schedules and set their own hours. The pay is assessed at a fixed rate per 
minute of time on the phone with callers and typically varies between $8-1 5 for an hour of work, 
which includes both time spent on the phone with callers and idle time spent waiting for calls. 
The average utilization rate, the percentage of the work time spent on the phone with callers, is 
about 50% in the period we study. 
Computer -assisted training of new recruits takes place on-line without any coaching by 
the firm's personnel. In its instructions to potential job applicants, the firm explicitly states that it 
does not provide compulsory training beyond the recruitment process and seeks applicants who 
are already capable of providing a professional level of services. 
To motivate performance, the firm makes sales agents compete against each other. The 
vee continuously monitors performance by individual product and uses this data to assign 
agents their positions in the queue for receiving calls. Better performers have priority, regardless 
of the number of calls they have already processed. Remuneration is determined entirely by the 
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time an agent spends on the phone with callers and thereby is closely linked to her priority in the 
queue. 
The workers' status as independent contractors, their work-at-home arrangement, a 
highly competitive environment and transparent performance measures closely linked to rew ards 
all point to an arm' s-length employment relationship. The vee purposefully shapes it that way 
by emphasizing that it helps its agents develop and sustain their own home-based businesses. 
\Vhenever the conventional descriptions of the organizational structure do not reflect the arm's 
length relationship, they are promptly replaced. For example, initially the v e e assigned to each 
agent an agent supervisor who was supposed to monitor her performance, provide help, and 
resolve conflicts. When it was noticed that the term "agent supervisor" is incompatible with a 
market-like relationship, it was replaced by "agent facilitator." 
The Recruitment Process at the vee 
The v e e does not have a pre-set number of v acancies but strives to ensure that the number of 
agents and their work schedules correspond to the demand for their services. To send a clear 
signal that it does not hire a permanent labor force and instead contracts free agents to conduct 
its business, the v e e refers to its recruitment process as "certification." The certif ication process 
consists of multiple stages. To prepare for them, an applicant registers on the v e e 's website and 
provides her background information: education, Spanish speaking skills, y ears of experience in 
sales and call centers, and so forth. 
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On Stage One, the testing stage, an applicant decides whether to take reading and logic 
tests2 and if she fails even one of them, her application is rejected and she may not proceed 
further. The test is administered entirely on the Web with the computer calculating the score and 
making the decision. Thus, according to our classification, Stage One consists of two analytically 
separate sub-stages of self-selection and objectiv e selection: an applicant self-selects into taking 
the tests while the computer determines whether she passes them according to an objective 
criterion. 
Next, an applicant decides whether or not to take a voice test. Although HR personnel do 
not ev aluate results immediately , but rather later, together with the whole application package, 
the job candidate cannot proceed further without taking this test and therefore we put taking the 
voice test into a separate Stage Two. According to our classification, it fits into the self-selection 
category. 
W ith the voice test taken, a job candidate' s application package is complete and ready for 
screening, and subsequent approval or denial. During the screening process the HR personnel 
rev iew the materials submitted, listen to the voice test recording, and conduct a phone interview, 
although the latter does not always take place. This is where the recruitment process has a 
bottleneck. HR personnel are physically incapable of processing all the applications in a timely 
manner and have to establish some priority. The absence of formal procedures gives leeway to 
individual HR officers . This makes the process vulnerable to external influences and some of the 
2 In reality, Stage One is intertwined with the registration process, since applicants are allowed to 
provide the background information and take tests in any order they wish. However, a negligibly 
small number of applicants move to tests before submitting background information. 
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firm' s current agents seize the opportunity . Their typical intervention takes the form of an 
electronic recommendation such as the following: 3 
"I am writing regarding My niece, Kim Johnson. She talked to Mary on thursday and was 
told that she would process her application; someone named (lola or lena) would be calling 
her on friday or monday . She is still waiting to here from her. Kim's im is 
kim@Yahoo.com. Thanks for passing the message along ." 
As the next two examples suggest, some agents make an explicit pitch on behalf of their 
protege while others take a seemingly neutral stand: 
"Hi Dana .. .. 
Good new s! I got a new computer this weekend, and as y ou can see by my weekend, things 
are working out great! You should be seeing a lot more of me! :-) 
Secondly, I wanted to let y ou know that I have referred 2 people to VCC. One is a friend I 
hav e known since 5th grade and the other is my mother. Nina Eider applied a little over a 
week ago and hasn't heard anything yet, and my mother, Sylvia Morgan, just applied today. 
I know there isn't a referral program or anything, but was hoping that making you aware of 
it might help in some way .. .. especially for my mother. Things are pretty rough for my 
parents financially and I think this would be a great answer for them. 
They are both very reliable and ethical people and I think they would be good additions to 
the VCC team. I know they are both anxious to begin their home based businesses. 
Thanks so much for your time, and have a wonderful day ! 
Anna Morgan" 
"So it turns out that Kathy's daughter is apply ing to become a VCC agent. She passed all 
the tests but hasn' t heard anything for 3 weeks . I told her to ask you guys to push her 
through, but she' s adamant that Ellen (her daughter) is to receiv e NO special treatment. 
Whatever. Her name is Ellen Norton. She used to work in the development group for 
VCC, but her app still may not catch your attention. Can you guys pass her through? Don't 
tell Kathy ; -)" 
As one can see from these recommendations, getting attention from HR personnel poses a 
challenge for referrers. As the last message suggests, the VCC's HR personnel treat such 
attempts favorably, in particular, since the agreement to screen does not commit them to a 
3 To preserve the anonymity of the firm and agents, we substitute fictional names for the real 
ones. 
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positive recruitment decision. In our interviews with HR personnel, all of them claimed that the 
firm does not treat referrals differently and, in fact, does not pay attention to recruitment sources 
when deciding whether to approve a particular application. Such claims are consistent with the 
arm's-length employment relationships the firm establishes with its sales agents. Recently the 
firm realized that hiring through referrals becomes an impediment for the geographic 
div ersification of its labor force. A substantial portion of the sales agents reside in Florida and 
Texas and therefore are at high risk of disruption during hurricane season. They also tend to go 
to church at the same time on Sunday mornings, which happens to be a popular shopping time. 
If an application is approved, the HR department sends to the applicant some paperwork 
and directs her to assemble computer equipment and to sign up for telecommunication services 
necessary to perform the functions of a sales agent. Since the agent fully controls the process at 
this stage, Stage Four, which we call Agent Creation, it can be characterized as a self-selection 
stage. 
On Stage Five, the training stage, the candidate goes through on-line training which 
consists of taking quizzes and making two sales of real products to real callers. When the sales 
are completed, the candidate is certified and becomes a full-fledged sales agent for the VCC. The 
HR department has no means to intervene in this process or influence its outcome, and therefore 
the stage fits into the objective selection category4 
To summarize, the five stages of the recruitment process cover all the three types of 
selection stages introduced in the previous section. Passing the Reading and Logic Tests and 
4 In principle, a referrer may complete the training on her behalf, although in practice it is highly 
unlikely. At the end of the day, the protege is the one who needs to make a living, since there is 
no reason why the referrer may want to work under another name at the same vee. Moreov er, 
the vee punishes severely for misrepresentation, i.e ., logging in its system under another 
agent' s ID. 
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Training constitute objective selection; taking the Reading and Logic Tests, taking the Voice 
Test, and Agent Creation represent self-selection; finally , the Approval stage is an instance of 
subjective selection. 
The VCC promotes sales jobs entirely over the Internet in a passive mode (cf., Marsden 
and Gorman 2001, Yakubovich 2006). It does not advertise them, but instead relies on word-of-
mouth and a variety ofwebsites known to be visited by appropriate audiences, such as at-home 
workers, stay -at-home mothers and people with disabilities. One of the items in the application 
questionnaire asks the applicant to state how she found out about the job and, if she was referred 
internally , the name of the sales agent who referred her. We use this piece of information to 
identify the recruitment channel. 
DATA AND METHOD 
Data 
We analyze the VCC's complete database of applications for the position of sales agent 
submitted between September 2004 and February 2005. The database contains 14,843 records of 
everyone who started the 5-stage certification process. Applicants from the states of N ew York, 
California, Oregon, W ashington, Alaska, and Hawaii are automatically deemed unqualified 
because of state laws that limit a firm's ability to utilize independent contractors. After removing 
these applicants, the sample size becomes 13,387. 190 applicants were returning agents. Of the 
remaining applicants, 22 indiv iduals previously conv icted for financial crimes are also rejected 
by the VCC and therefore excluded from the analysis . 227 applicants did not officially submit 
their applications, because they did not click the submit button, and therefore have never been 
processed. Further, 328 records cannot be analyzed because they hav e missing values for some 
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variables of interest (gender, ethnicity, income). The company considers only those who provide 
all the required background information. 3,612 applicants failed to do so which leaves us with 
9,008 cases available for analysis. 
The Dependent Variables 
Our research questions require a dependent variable for each stage of the recruitment process. 
The Reading and Logic Tests stage includes two selection steps and therefore are represented by 
two dependent v ariables. The dependent variable for each selection step is a dummy coded 0/1 : 
(1 .1) reading and logic tests taken, (1. 2) reading and logic tests passed; (2) v oice test taken; (3) 
application approved; ( 4) agent created; (5) training completed . 
Since a candidate is rejected after the first failure, "taking both tests" means that a 
candidate either took both tests or took one test, failed, and therefore was not allowed to take the 
second test. In other words, the variable 'reading and logic tests taken' is equal to zero only 
when an applicant voluntary decided to not take a test. Accordingly, the variable ' reading and 
logic tests passed' is defined for the applicants who took both tests in the sense just explained. In 
a similar fashion, the variable 'voice test taken' is defined for those who passed the reading and 
logic tests, the variable 'agent approved' for those who passed all the tests, the variable ' agent 
created' for those who were approved, and finally, the v ariable 'training completed' for those 
who passed the preceding Agent Creation Stage. Thus, we have six dependent variables defined 
on a set of nested samples. W e discuss how to model them in the Statistical Models section 
below . 
17 
The Independent Variables: Hiring Channel and the Referrer's Performance 
A closed-end question on the vee application form asks a candidate how she found out about 
the job and offers the choice among six mutually exclusive answers : another agent, friend, job 
ad, bulletin board, chat room, and other. Since the firm does not advertise the j ob in traditional 
mass media, we combine "job ad," "bulletin board," and "chat room" into one category "the 
Internet" and treat it as a reference group. 
The distinction between the two types of personal contacts, "agent" and "friend," is 
important. The former is a proper referrer who possesses information about the employer and can 
influence the recruitment process. Our conversations with the vee' s HR personnel suggest that 
the category "friend" is heterogeneous. Mainly , it includes people unaffiliated with the v ee who 
learned about the job from others or over the Internet and represent essentially another market 
channel, the only difference being that they target a specific person rather than broadcast 
information widely. In a small number of cases, the friend can be a staff member of the Vee 
whose influence on recruitment is stronger than that of sales agents. We consider it as a distinct 
channel for the purpose of this analysis and assign to it a separate dummy variable. 
An applicant who indicates that she was referred to the job by an agent is supposed to put 
the name of the agent on the application form. We coded each agent by the individual agent ID 
assigned by the vee, which allowed us to link these data to performance variables. W e measure 
each referring agent's performance by the utilization rate. Because the agent is paid a fixed rate 
per minute on the phone, the utilization rate is proportional to the hourly wage, which is not 
perfect but certainly an adequate indicator of the agent's performance in our setting. Essentially, 
it measures the agent's fit to the job. The utilization rate varies with the overall demand for the 
vee's services, and therefore we construct the performance variable as relative performance by 
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div iding the utilization rate of the focal agent for a two-week pay period by the mean utilization 
rate over the same period and averaging it over all the pay periods worked by the agent during 
the observation window of our study . 388 agents became referrers before they started working 
themselv es; we combine them in one group labeled "unrated agents. " 
Control Variables5 
To control for the factors that affect a job candidate' s progression through the recruitment stages, 
we code the background information prov ided on the application. Three dummies - "university" 
and "advanced degree" with "secondary school" as a reference category- capture candidates' 
education level. Relevant skills are measured by the dummies "call center experience" and 
"telemarketing experiences," and by the continuous variable "sales experience" coded in six two-
year increments: 1-2 years, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-1 0, more than 10 years. The overall job experience is 
measured by the number of jobs the applicant has had over her career. 
The vee is particularly interested in recruiting agents with excellent Spanish skills. The 
dummy variable "excellent Spanish" reflects that concern; it is equal to 1 if the applicant reports 
excellent spoken and written Spanish. 
In accordance with anti-discrimination laws, the vee is not allowed to solicit 
information on the gender and race of their job applicants. Since the vee's sales agents are 
predominantly women, gender may be an issue for both recruitment and performance (Reskin 
and McBrier 2000, Fernandez and Sosa 2003). To control for it, we code a dummy "female" 
from a respondent's first name. 
5 A concise dictionary of all the v ariables used in the analysis is in Appendix. 
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To control for race, we use as proxies the percentages of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in 
the zip code area where the agent resides. We also take into account the area's overall economic 
prosperity and job opportunities by measuring its per capita income. The zip code-level v ariables 
come from the 2000 US Census data. 
Since the VCC is concerned about the geographic diversificat ion of its agent pool, an 
applicant's chances of passing the Approval stage may be affected by the number of available 
agents and other applicants from the same state in the same time period. To control for this 
situation we construct a variable which counts the number of activ e agents from the same state at 
the time when the application is screened for approv al. 
Statistical Models 
Our dependent v ariables are observed on progressively smaller subsamples of the original pool 
of applicants; for those who fail the previous stage, the value of the dependent variable for the 
following stage is undetermined. This well-known sample selection problem can lead to biased 
conclusions about the effects of specific variables. For example, to properly evaluate the 
relationship between referrals and the likelihood of successfully passing the training stage, the 
VCC would need to allow all the applicants to enter the training stage. Instead, only those who 
become agents may go into training. To the degree in which the selection process removes less 
capable applicants, whether referred or not, the survivors should be more uniformly qualified and 
therefore any advantage of referrals, if it existed, should decline. At the extreme, an analy sis of 
surviv ing referrals will lead us to the false conclusion that they are equally qualified w ith 
nonreferrals. 
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To address this problem, we estimate a regression model with selection. Basically , it 
consists oftwo models . The first is a selection model of an applicant' s chances to proceed to the 
stage under consideration; the second one is the probit model that estimates the applicant's 
chances to succeed at that stage. Both models are estimated simultaneously using the full-
information maximum likelihood method which provides consistent and asymptotically efficient 
estimates for all the parameters (StataCorp 2003: 75-84). 
The v ariable "performance of a rated agent" is defined only in those cases when the 
hiring channel is an agent whose performance can be rated, i.e., when the agent has been 
working for at least one two-week pay period before referring the applicant. At the same time, in 
order to obtain the effect of a referral, w e have to estimate our models for all the applicants, 
whether they are recruited with the help of a rated agent or not. This can be done if the dummy 
variable X1 for a rated agent as a hiring channel and the continuous v ariable Xz for the 
performance of a rated agent are included in a model in the following way: 
aX 1+ bX1X2 = (a+ bXz)X1, 
where a and bare estimated coefficients. When X 1 is equal to 0, i.e. , when the applicant is not 
referred by a rated agent, X2 can take any finite value, since the product X1X 2 is equal to 0 
anyway. The right-hand side of the equation above shows that this specification fits exactly the 
propositions we are testing. N amely, it suggests that the effect of a referral expressed as (a+ bX 2) 
varies with the referrer's performance X z. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 contains the descriptive characteristics of the variables included in the analysis. It is split 
into two parts, A and B, for categorical and continuous characteristics, respectively. 
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Tables 1 a and 1 b about here 
As Table 1a shows, 9008 job seekers completed an application form on the VCC' s website and 
thereby initiated the recruitment process. More than 80% of them are women, which is consistent 
with other evidence that work at home attracts primarily females, stay-at-home mothers in 
particular. More than two thirds of the applicants hold university degrees and another 7% 
advanced degrees, which is a high level of education for a sales agent job. The average applicant 
comes from an area w ith about $20,000 annual income per capita. The applicants appear well 
qualified for the job. More than half of them have worked for call centers before, slightly less 
than half have telemarketing experience, and the average tenure in sales is about 3 years. 
About 24% of the applicants found out about vacancies from a sales agent currently 
working for the firm; another 24. 8% receiv ed the same information from a friend who is not an 
agent. Thus, 48.8% of the applicants learned about the job through personal contacts, which is 
remarkably similar to numerous previous studies (for review, see Granovetter 1995, Marsden and 
Gorman 200 1). As job candidates progress through the hir ing stages, the proportion of those 
referred by other agents slowly but steadily increases. The proportion of those who learn about 
the job from friends who are not agents fluctuates around the 25% mark while the percentage of 
those who get job information from the Internet gradually decreases from 35.9% at the Reading 
and Logic Tests Stage to 26. 1% at the Training Stage. The category "other" is responsible for 
about 14%-15% of candidates, which is significant for a residual category. We do not have 
additional information to decompose it further. 
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As one could expect, the mean performance of rated agents is close to one, since a 
referring agent's performance is, essentially, her utilization rate divided by the average 
utilization rate (although the averaging is done within each pay period rather than over the whole 
observation period of the study). An interesting point is that the mean performance gradually 
increases from 0 . 9 o 1.1 as the recruitment process progresses from one step to the next. This 
suggests that at least on the descriptive lev el, a referrer ' s performance is positively related to her 
protege' s chances to succeed. 
Table 2 shows the applicants ' chance of succeeding across the stages of the recruitment 
process by selected individual characteristics. Men do slightly better on tests, although this does 
not help them at the critical Approval and Training Stages where women are more successful. 
Not surprisingly , higher educated people do better on the reading and logic tests. However, they 
look slightly ov erqualified for the job on the Training Stage where candidates with secondary 
education are more successful than those with higher and advanced degrees. 
Table 2 about here 
The transition rates by hiring channel shed first light on the main theme of the paper. We 
see that through all the steps of the recruitment process but Approval the applicants referred by 
other experienced agents do much better than anybody else. W e carry out regression analysis to 
find out w hether this advantage is still present when other factors are controlled for and whether 
it varies by the performance of the referrer. It should also help us understand the exceptional 
status of the Approval Stage. Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for the models with the 
variable for the referrer 's performance included; Table 4 shows the coefficients for hiring 
channels when referring agents are not differentiated by their performance. 
Tables 3, 4 about here 
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Some effects of the control variables shed light on the inner workings of the recruitment 
process at the VCC. Despite being less likely to pass the Reading and Logic Tests, female 
applicants are given a priority by the HR staff on the Approval Stage. The inconsistency between 
the objective criterion and subjective opinion more likely indicates that the tests are not 
comprehensive measures of all the job requirements rather than an ev idence of the HR 
personnel's bias. 
A higher lev el of education helps the applicants with the reading and logic tests but 
becomes irrelev ant as the recruiting process unfolds, which is not surprising , since it is not a 
prerequisite for a sales agent. Call center experience makes a difference on all the stages but the 
last two. Telemarketing experience does not add much on any of the stages. Sales experience is 
highly desirable, and therefore it is not surprising that it plays a significant role on the Approval 
stage. The negative effect of the number of the current agents in the applicant's state on 
Approval reflects the VCC' s concern about the geographic diversity of the agent population. 
Following the logic of our theoretical arguments, we look at the effects of referrals on 
self-selection steps of the recruitment process: Test Taking, Voice Test, and Agent Creation. In 
all these cases, the estimated coefficient for the variable Agent in Table 4 is positive and 
statistically significant. As Proposition 1 claims, referred applicants are more likely to self-select 
into continuing the recruitment process. The findings in Table 3 reveal that on two self-selection 
stages, Test Taking and Agent Creation, the likelihood of passing increases with the referrer 's 
performance. For example, as shown on Figure 1, the impact of a referring agent whose 
performance is twice as high as the average performance is more than double the impact of a 
referring agent whose performance is at the lower end (. 835 coefficient v ersus .361). Similar 
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patterns appear on Figures 3 and 5 for the Voice Test and Agent Creation Stages, although the 
slope of the line is not statistically significant for the former. 
To test Proposition 2, we interpret the effects of a referrer' s performance on the two 
objective steps: Test Passing and Training. On the Test Passing step, an applicant is required to 
score at least 60 points (out of 1 00) on two different tests which measure her reading and 
analytical abilities. As shown in Table 3, the Rho coefficient has a high value of .948 and is 
statistically significant which implies that the pro bit model with selection is superior to the 
conventional probit model. The estimates show that an applicant referred by a current agent is 
not better than an Internet applicant but that an applicant from the other channels fares 
significantly worse. One plausible explanation is that it is not necessarily the difficulty of the test 
per se which prevents applicants referred by non-agent friends from scoring well, 6 but it may be 
their unfamiliarity with Internet based tests. Internet applicants are probably computer savvy, and 
for a person referred by an agent, the gap can be closed if the agent explains to the applicant how 
the computer-based application works. 
For the Training Stage, the probit model with selection does not improve the fit in 
comparison with the conv entional probit model (the Rho coefficient is insignificant) and the 
estimates of the coefficients slightly vary in magnitude but not in the significance level between 
the models. In accordance with Proposition 2, Table 3 shows that the likelihood of passing the 
Training Stage increases with the referrer' s performance. Figure 7 illustrates the pattern of the 
increase. Low performing referrers do not make any difference. As the referrer' s relative 
utilization rate reaches .8, the effect of the referral on the applicant's success in training becomes 
6 Our interviews with the VCC's HR personnel and observations of the company's operating 
procedures suggest that the tests are not designed to precisely identifY "certifiable" candidates. 
They are purposefully designed to be pretty liberal and to reject only apriori weak and 
unmotivated applicants. 
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statistically different from zero. In substantive terms, the impact of the highest performing 
referrers is almost double the impact of medium performing referrers. Thus, Proposition 2 holds 
on the Training Stage. 
Finally, we look at the subjectiv e Approval Stage. As shown in Table 3 (column 4), the 
likelihood of an applicant being approv ed increases with the referrer' s performance. Thus, the 
subjective process of approval is pretty much aligned with the objective stages with regard to the 
treatment of referrals; being referred per se does not make a difference, the performance of the 
referrer does matter. In particular, as Figure 4 shows, applicants referred by low performing 
agents are more likely to be rejected than Internet applicants; the negativ e effect persists until the 
referrer's relative utilization rate reaches 0.4. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our study extends the literature on social networks in recruitment to the new domains of virtual 
organizations and independent contractors. These domains are characterized by an arm' s-length 
relationship between the firm and its labor force, competition among workers, the firm's 
generally passive attitude towards recruitment and ignorance of the channels through which it 
takes place, and workers ' ambivalence regarding loy alty to the employer and the quality of the 
applicants they refer. The fact that even under such circumstances networks remain salient and 
referrals are beneficial to the employer nicely illustrates the structural side of networks' role in 
the labor market, independent of the interests and motivations of the parties inv olv ed. Referrals 
still make a difference because they are driven by a number of social mechanisms bey ond the 
firm's and workers ' control. In particular, social homophily and information exchange between 
referrers and job candidates are at work, no matter how actively the firm shapes its relationship 
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with the labor force and its pool of applicants. Since a detailed large-scale representative study of 
recruitment across many diverse organizations is still infeasible, a case-by-case approach to 
enlarging the scope and testing the limits of our theories is the second best option whose promise 
the paper demonstrates. 
While a number of recent studies that pursue this strategy document advantages of 
referrals (e.g., Fernandez et. al. 2000, Petersen et. al. 2000), they cannot tell whether these 
advantages result from objective strengths of referrals, their motiv ation and persistence, or 
recruiting managers' subjective belief in their superiority. The virtual organization of the 
recruitment process allows us to separate these factors. We find robust evidence that referrals are 
more persistent through the stages when the applicants must decide themselves whether to 
continue. At the same time, we also find support for the assertion that not all referrals are 
objectively better candidates: only the referrers of relatively high-performing agents are more 
likely to complete the training which is as close to actual performance as one can reach within 
the recruitment process. This finding is another contribution of the paper made possible by the 
extensive trail of accurate electronic data that a v irtual organization offers. The fact that referrals 
do not do significantly better on the Reading and Logic Tests does not invalidate our 
conclusions, as the tests are designed to screen out the weakest candidates rather than to find the 
strongest ones. 
Finally, we shed new light on the subjective judgments ofHR personnel by showing that 
referrals attract their attention and offering some anecdotal evidence on referrers ' exercise of 
influence at the v e e. Although attracting attention is not identical to being approved, our 
analysis suggests that screening is the key stage in the v e e 's recruitment process and, most 
likely, in any Internet-based recruitment. If the barriers to submitting an application are low, HR 
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personnel risk being overwhelmed by applicants. As a result, waiting for screening may take 
months, as is the case at the vee, and therefore referrers' ability to reduce the waiting period 
presents a critical advantage. From the HR personnel's perspectiv e, paying attention to referrals 
is generally warranted, if only because they do better on the Training Stage, which is as close to 
performance as we can get with the data at hand. Howev er, it also makes sense to expedite the 
screening of highly qualified individuals who are not referred, since our analysis suggests that 
they are likely to lose interest in the position if not contacted quickly enough. 
More generally, our analysis shows that to control pervasive self-selection, practitioners 
of online recruitment should proceed expeditiously or risk losing the most attractive applicants. 
In the long run, the continuous disappointment of qualified candidates as well as excessiv e 
numbers of unqualified ones may become the primary factor that will turn on-line recruitment 
into another formal channel with low reputation. 7 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics ' 2001 Current Population Survey finds that about 12.5 
million workers, or only 9 .4% of the labor force, practice alternative forms of employment as 
independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and contract company 
workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001). This raises the concern about too narrow a scope of 
our results. Although any definite claims are impossible without additional research, it would be 
a mistake to rule out generalizations completely. As restructuring and downsizing become a way 
of life for American firms, security, in-kind benefits, and career trajectories traditionally offered 
by long-term employment relationships are being left in the past (Barker and Christensen 1998, 
Capelli 1999). As a result, ev en traditional forms of employment become driven by competitive 
7 The results of our research which are not reported here show that the longer it takes the VCC to 
screen an applicant, the more likely it is that the applicant will refuse to proceed to the Agent 
Creation Stage because she is not interested in the job anymore. This is particularly true for 
better qualified candidates. 
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forces which erode the reputational concerns and loyalty typically associated with such forms. 
The experiences of independent contractors may teach us something about traditional 
employment relationships as well. 
By the same token, independent contractors may not exactly be the free agents the 
literature portrays them to be. For example, the VCC maintains a chat room where sales agents 
go to not only to resolve technical problems but to engage in social interactions with the 
colleagues who work with them on the same shift. Relationships forged in such interactions may 
strengthen agents' group identity and their attachment to the workplace. Only future research can 
tell if such processes take place and how they shape the firm's recruitment. 
In addition to v irtual organization and independent contractors, another important 
contextual detail of the paper's setting is the completely informal role of the recruitment through 
networks at the VCC. So far, the best empirical studies on the topic rely on data accumulated as a 
byproduct of employers' formal referral policies. Fully aware of the utility of social networks in 
recruitment, employers treat them as a key component of such policies. Social networks become 
a tool for screening for talent and reaching out to potential job candidates who otherwise would 
not apply (Breaugh and Mann 1984; Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Fernandez, Castilla, and 
Moore 2000; Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel2000). Paradoxically, researchers manage to shed 
new light on informal structures, only to the degree in which those are formalized. Our study 
benefits from the fact that any activ ity on the Internet leaves a record, whether or not the actors 
desire one. The employer we study neither rewards its sales agents for referrals nor advertises its 
vacancies. We empirically show that in this more informal setting, referrals maintain an 
important labor market role, which brings the literature on referrals closer to its origins in the 
literature on organizations' embeddedness in informal social networks. 
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Table l a: Frequency Distribution for Selected Categorical Characteristics of Job Candidates 
Ste12s of the Recruitment Process 
Reading and Logic Tests Voice Test Approval Agent Creation Training 
Taken Passed 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Hiring Channel 
Rated Agent 1777 19.7 1579 21.8 1279 22.7 1167 24.1 704 23.9 526 29.4 
Unrated Agent 388 4.3 327 4.5 258 4.6 226 4.6 144 4.9 99 5.5 
Friend 2236 24.8 1834 25.3 1371 24.3 11 88 24.5 71 4 24.3 462 25.8 
Internet 3234 35.9 2414 33.4 1897 33.7 1558 32.1 957 32.6 466 26.0 
Other 1373 15.3 1082 15.0 827 14.7 709 14.6 417 14.2 235 13.1 
Female 7489 83.1 5999 82.9 4643 82.4 3991 82.3 2461 83.8 1499 83.8 
Education 
Secondary 2141 23.8 1696 23.4 1184 21.0 1015 21.0 586 20.0 330 18.5 
Higher 6221 69.0 5013 69.3 4011 71.2 3445 71.1 2112 71.9 1304 72.9 
Advanced 646 7.2 527 7.3 437 7.8 388 8.0 238 8.1 154 8.6 
Call Center Experience 4817 53.4 3990 55.1 3181 56.5 2812 58.0 1869 63.6 1162 64.9 
Telemarketing Experience 3972 44.1 3292 45.5 2582 45.8 2269 46.8 1466 49.9 895 50.0 
Excellent S12anish 412 4.6 328 4.5 236 4.2 208 4.3 172 5.8 11 6 6.5 
Total 9008 7236 5632 4848 2936 1788 
Table lb: Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Continuous Characteristics of Job Candidates 
SteEs of the Recruitment Process 
Reading and Logic Tests Voice Test Approval Agent Creation Training 
Taken Passed 
Performance of Rated Agent .9 .9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
.4 .4 .4 .4 .4 .4 
Sales Experience 3. 1 3.1 3. 1 3.2 3.5 3.6 
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Previous Job Experience 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Asian(%) 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1. 7 1.7 
2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 
Black(%) 15.5 15.8 15.5 15.9 15.4 15.7 
22. 1 22.2 21.9 22.3 21.8 21.9 
Hispanic (%) 10.5 10.7 10.6 10.9 11.4 11 .5 
17.2 17.3 17.2 17.6 18.3 18.3 
Whites(%) 69.9 69.3 69.8 69.0 68.9 68.4 
27.2 27.4 27.3 27.6 27.7 27.9 
Income (in $1000) 20.6 20.5 20.7 20.7 20.7 20.7 
6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Number of Agents from 195.5 201.1 199.9 204.3 181.4 197.9 
Same State 203.2 204.6 205.3 208.3 186. 7 194.7 
Total 9008 7236 5632 4848 2936 1788 
Table 2. The Rates of Transition across Steps of the Recruitment Process by Selected Charactedstics of the Applicants 
SteEs of the Recruitment Process 
Reading and Logic Tests Voice Test Approval Agent Creation Training 
Taken Passed 
Enter Pass% Enter Pass% Enter Pass% Enter Pass% Enter Pass% Enter Pass% 
N N N N N N 
Hiri112 Channel: 
Rated Agent 1777 88.8 1579 81 .0 1279 91.2 1167 60.3 704 74.7 526 84.4 
Umated Agent 388 84.2 327 78.8 258 87.5 226 63.7 144 68.7 99 74.7 
Friend 2236 82.0 1834 74.7 1371 86.6 1188 60.1 714 64.7 462 75.6 
Internet 3234 74.6 2414 78.5 1897 82.1 1558 61.4 957 48.7 466 73.6 
Other 1373 78.8 1082 76.4 827 85.7 709 58.8 417 56.3 235 74.0 
Gender: Female 7489 80.1 5999 77.3 4643 85.9 3991 61.6 2461 60.9 1499 77.4 
Male 1519 81.4 1237 79.9 989 866 857 55.4 475 608 289 74.4 
Education: 
Secondary 2141 79.2 1696 69.8 1184 85.7 1015 57.7 586 56.3 330 79.4 
Higher 6221 80.5 5013 80.0 4011 85.8 3445 61.3 2112 61.7 1304 76.2 
Advanced 646 81.5 527 82.9 437 88.7 388 61.3 238 64.7 154 78.0 
Call Center Experience: Yes 4817 82.8 3990 79.7 3181 88.4 2812 66.5 1869 62.2 1162 75.8 
No 4191 77.4 3246 75.5 2451 83.0 2036 52.4 1067 58.7 626 78 .9 
Telemarketing Experience: Yes 3972 82.8 3292 78.4 2582 87.8 2269 63.7 1466 61.1 895 77.3 
No 5036 78.3 3944 77.3 3050 84.5 2579 57.0 1470 60.7 893 76.5 
Excellent Spanish: Yes 412 79.6 328 71.9 236 88.1 208 82.7 172 67 .4 116 73 .3 
No 8596 80.3 6908 78.1 5396 85.9 4640 59.6 2764 60.5 1672 77.2 
Total 9008 80.3 7236 77.8 5632 86.0 4848 60.6 2936 60.9 1788 76.9 
Table 3. The Probability of a Job Candidate Completing a Step of the Rec1·uitment Process: 
Bivariate Pro bit Model with the A~ent- Referrer's Performance as a Predictor, Controllin~ for Selection at the Previous Steps t 
Steps o f the Recmitment Process 
Tests Taking Tests Passing Voice Test Approval Agent Creation Training 
Type of Selection Self-Selection Objective Self-Selection Subjective Self-Selection Objective 
Hiring Channel (Internet) 
Rated Agent 








Call Center Experience 
Sales Experience 
Excellent Spanish 
Previous Job Experience 
Telemarketing Experience 











-.01 1 (.041 ) 
.024 (.036) 
.063 (.066) 








-.171 (.040)** * 
-.111 (.047)* 
-.097 (.042)* 
.27 4 (.035)*** 
.37 4 (.068)** * 
.1 03 (.034)** 
-.005 (.005) 
-.167 (.069)* 
.057 (.016)** * 
-.028 (.033) 
















-.258 (.1 04)** 
.202 (.099)* 












.110 (. 137) 
.532 (.1 57)*** 






.077 (. 128) 
.005 (.011 ) 
-.018 (. 145) 
-.047 (.053) 
.631 (. 186)*** 
-.099 (.665) 
-.013 (.186) 










-.491 (.168)* * 
.352 (.795) 
Sample Size 9008 7236 5632 4848 2936 1788 
Rho(chi2) -.948 (9.100)* * -.867 (8. 140)** -.467 (2.490) -. 177 (. 170) .169 (.190) 
Log Likelihood -4342.649 -8083.300 -8019.486 -9102.341 -7315.992 -5192.880 
1 The model for the first step is simple pro bit. The selection models for the subsequent steps are omitted and available from the authors upon request. 
Table 4. The Probability of a Job Candidate Completing a Step of the Rec1·uitment Process: 
Bivariate Pro bit Model with the Agent- Referrer as a Predictor, Controlling for Selection at the Previous Steps t 
Steps of the Recruitment Process 
Tests Taking Tests Passing Voice Test Approval Agent Creation 
Hiring Channel (Internet) 
Agent .509 (.042)*** -.027 (.042) .246 (.052)*** -.052 (.076) .250 (.104)* 
Friend .247 (.039)* ** -.171 (.040)** * .131 (.049)** -.003 (.051) .187 (.07 4)* 
Other .124 (.045)** -.111 (.047)** .109 (.057) -.076 (.055) .098 (.060) 
Sample Size 9008 7236 5632 4848 2936 
f Only the coefficient estimates for the hiring channels are shown. The other coefficients are identical to their counterparts in Table 3. 
Training 
.1 03 (. 146) 
-.066 (.095) 










Fig.1. The Effect ofthe Referrer's Performance on 
the likelihood of Taking Tests 
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Fig. 3. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the 
likelihood of Taking the Voice Test 
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Fig. 2. The Effect of the Referrer's Performance on 
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Fig. 4. The Effect of Referrer's Perfonnance on the 
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Fig. 5. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the 
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Fig. 6. The Effect of Referrer's Performance on the 
Likelihood of Passing the Training Stage 
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Call Center Experience 
Sales Experience 
Previous Job Experience 
Telemarketing Experience 
Excellent Spanish 






= 1 if the referrer is a current agent with performance record 
= 1 if the referrer is a current agent without a perform. record 
= mean relative utilization rate of the agent across pay periods 
= 1 if the referrer is a non-agent friend 
= 1 if the referrer is an Internet based channel 
(chat room, bulletin board, job ad) 
1 if the applicant graduated from a secondary school 
1 if the applicant has a university degree 
1 if the applicant has an advanced degree 
= 1 if the applicant has call center experience 
Number of years of experience in sales 
Number of previous jobs held by the applicant 
= 1 if the applicant has telemarketing experience 
= 1 if the applicant speaks and writes perfectly in Spanish 
= Number of agents in the VCC sy stem, from the same state 
with the applicant 
Percent of Asian population in the in the applicant' s zip code 
Percent of Black population in the in the applicant' s zip code 
Percent of Hispanic population in the in the applicant' s zip code 
Logged of income in the applicant's zip code 
